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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






TIJUANA JOHNSON,  
 on behalf of herself and other persons similarly situated,  




 WYNN'S EXTENDED CARE, INC.; NATIONAL CASUALTY COMPANY  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey                                                            
District Court No. 1-12-cv-00079 
District Judge: The Honorable Renee M. Bumb 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 9, 2015 
 
Before: FUENTES, SMITH, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 15, 2015)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Tijuana Johnson entered into a “Used Vehicle Service Contract” with 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
Wynn’s Extended Care, Inc. in February 2011.  In May of that same year, 
Johnson’s car needed repairs that she claims were covered by the service contract.  
Wynn, however, refused to authorize the repairs.  After negotiations broke down, 
Johnson filed a class action suit in state court alleging that the service contract 
violated several state statutes.1  Wynn subsequently agreed to pay for the necessary 
repairs.  Johnson does not dispute that her car was fixed.  Johnson, however, 
alleges additional losses including the loss of use of her car for five months as well 
as losses resulting from having to pay insurance and towing costs while the car was 
being fixed.2 
 Our review is limited to one question: whether the provision waiving 
attorney’s fees in Wynn’s service contract violated the New Jersey’s Truth in 
Consumer Contract Warranty and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”).  While this case 
initially involved several additional claims, Johnson’s second amended complaint 
only pled violations of the TCCWNA and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, 
thus limiting the scope of this case to potential violations of those two statutes.  
The parties then stipulated to the dismissal of all claims under the Consumer Fraud 
Act with prejudice.  Thus only the TCCWNA claims remain open on appeal. 
                                                 
1 This case was later properly removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness 




While Johnson attempts to make several arguments on appeal, she squarely 
presented only one such argument to the District Court when opposing Wynn’s 
motion to dismiss.  She argued that the service contract violated the TCCWNA 
because it contained a provision waiving attorney’s fees and splitting costs.3  By 
not raising any other arguments before the District Court, we find that Johnson 
forfeited her right to raise them on appeal.4  See Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United 
States, 182 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1999) ([A] party still must unequivocally put its 
position before the trial court at a point and in a manner that permits the court to 
consider its merits.”); Harris v. City of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“This court has consistently held that it will not consider issues that are raised for 
the first time on appeal.”). 
Turning to the merits of Johnson’s TCCWNA claim, we hold that the 
District Court erred in dismissing this claim at the pleading stage.  To find a 
violation of the TCCWNA, Johnson had to allege that the service contract 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 This case is therefore distinguishable from Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 768 F.3d 
871 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2311 (May 18, 2015) (No. 14-857), since 
Johnson was not granted complete relief. 
3 Unlike the District Court, we interpret the service contract’s provision waiving 
attorney’s fees as an actual waiver, not simply as a restatement of the American Rule.  
The plain language of the contract leads us to this conclusion: “[e]ach party shall pay the 
fees of its own attorneys . . . .” (emphasis added). 
 
4 The Court notes that even if Johnson’s TCCWNA claim based on alleged violations of 
the Plain Language Act (“PLA”) were not waived, it would still fail.  As the District 
Court found, the service contract was written in a simple, clear, and understandable way.  
It thus did not violate the PLA. 
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presented to her by Wynn “include[d] any provision that violates any clearly 
established legal right of a consumer . . . as established by State or Federal law.”  
N.J.S.A. § 56:12-15.  Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, 
we conclude that the service contract’s provision waiving attorney’s fees and 
splitting costs violates a clearly established legal right under New Jersey law. 
This is so because the New Jersey Supreme Court has clearly held that 
clauses preventing the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs, when mandated by 
statute, are unconscionable.  See Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 
114 (N.J. 2006) (“Like the attorney’s fees provision discussed above, the 
[provision requiring the appealing party to bear costs] is unconscionable to the 
extent that it would bar Harris from being awarded costs if she prevailed on her 
appeal.”).  In this case, both the CFA and the TCCWNA mandate the provision of 
attorney’s fees and costs for the prevailing party.  N.J.S.A. § 56:8-19 (“In all 
actions under [the Consumer Fraud Act], . . . the court shall also award reasonable 
attorneys’ fees, filing fees and reasonable costs of suit.”); N.J.S.A. § 56:12-17 
(“Any person who violates the provisions of [the TCCWNA] shall be liable to the 
aggrieved consumer for a civil penalty of not less than $100.00 or for actual 
damages, or both at the election of the consumer, together with reasonable 
attorney’s fees and court costs.”); N.J.S.A. § 56:12-16 (stating that under the 




TCCWNA “[n]o consumer contract . . . shall contain any provision by which the 
consumer waives his rights under this act”). 
Johnson’s TCCWNA claim is therefore sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss.5  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court only 
with respect to the alleged violation of the TCCWNA discussed above and will 
remand for further proceedings. 
 
 
                                                 
5 We also note that concerns regarding the enforceability of consumer contracts in New 
Jersey as a result of a potential ruling in favor of the plaintiff are unfounded.  See, e.g., 
Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 154 (1992) (“[I]f the illegal 
portion does not defeat the central purpose of the contract, we can sever it and enforce the 
rest of the contract.”). 
